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The Problem of Expressive Action1 
 
ABSTRACT 
Rational explanation of action out of emotion faces a number of challenges. The Wrong Explanation 
Challenge says that explaining action out of emotion by reference to a purpose rather than an emotion 
gets it wrong. The Redundancy Challenge says that if explanation of an action by reference to emotion is 
sufficient then rational explanation is redundant. And the No Further Justification Challenge says that 
there is no more to say, at the level of rational explanation, about why people act as they do out of a 
particular emotion. Furthermore, even if these challenges can be addressed, there is a Problem of 
Expressive Action, since many actions out of emotion seem unpromising candidates for being guided by 
normative practical reasons of the prudential, instrumental, deontic or consequentialist sort. In response, 
I argue that many actions out of emotions should be understood as expressive actions guided by the 
agent’s conception of normative practical reasons: specifically, their conception of expressive reasons. 
 
1. Problems in the Rational Explanation of Action out of Emotion 
We are creatures of emotion. That is a commonplace. But the fact that emotion 
influences our conduct raises a range of important philosophical questions. Is action out 
of emotion (ever) rational action? Can action out of emotion (ever) be seen as an 
untrammelled expression of our rational agency, or only as its interruption or 
suspension? If the mark of rational action is responsiveness to reasons, are there 
reasons on which we act when we act out of emotion? Or is it rather the case that, if we 
do follow reason in acting out of emotion, we do so only indirectly, coincidentally, 
without any direct responsiveness to rational considerations? 
 
                                                        
1 This paper was presented to audiences at the University of Valencia and the University of Pardubice, and 
I am grateful for the questions and comments that I received there. For discussion, I would particularly 
like to thank Maria Alvarez; Marina Barabas; Marta Cabrera; Josep Corbì; and Carlos Moya. I also received 
very helpful comments from two referees for this journal, for which I would like to express my gratitude. 
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As it will be understood in this paper, explanation of action in terms of rational agency 
portrays the action as being done on the basis of considerations that the agent took to 
count in favour of their action: that is by citing what the agent took to be reasons in the 
‘basic, normative sense,’ as Scanlon puts it (Scanlon 1999; see also Alvarez 2010; 
Skorupski 2010). In this respect, rational explanation of action is no different from the 
rational explanation of belief. When we explain, for instance, why someone holds a 
belief by citing the evidence on which they formed that belief, we are citing the 
considerations that that person took to count in that belief’s favour. The aim of rational 
explanation is to show how, as a rational agent, one came to believe or act as one did. In 
rational explanation, the belief or action is thus seen as the product of the agent’s 
sensitivity to facts that stand – or were taken by the agent to stand – in a relation of 
rational support to it. Whereas rational explanation of belief sees us as oriented to what 
we can rationally take to be true, however, rational explanation of action sees us as 
oriented to what we can rationally take to be good or valuable. Clearly, we do not 
always act on optimal normative reasons; but explanation in terms of an agent’s 
responsiveness to apparent normative reasons (that is, what the agent rationally takes 
to be the normative reasons that apply to them in the situation) is a key part of the way 
in which we make sense of the human world. 
 
Not all human behaviour is susceptible to rational explanation, but I will take it that 
some of it is. How do things stand with respect to action out of emotion? On the one 
hand, there might seem to be a number of challenges to the idea of rational explanation 
of action out of emotion. First of all, there might seem a basic lack of fit between rational 
explanation of action and explanation in terms of the influence of emotion. If I kick my 
broken-down car in anger because I will now miss an important engagement, or I ruffle 
 3 
my daughter’s hair out of affection, it would be strange to say that I do it for a reason. 
Rather, it might seem, I do it because of my emotion. Normative reasons might seem to 
involve a deliberative motivational ‘pull,’ in contrast to emotion’s spontaneous 
motivational ‘push’. There are cases in which I might do it for some further goal – for 
instance, I might kick the car in order to release my tension, or I might ruffle my child’s 
hair in order to make her understand that she is loved – but these are not the most 
common or most fundamental cases. We can call this the Wrong Explanation Challenge: 
explaining action out of emotion by reference to a purpose rather than an emotion gets 
it wrong.  
 
Furthermore, reference to the emotion seems to provide a sufficient explanation of such 
common actions. As Kovach and de Lancey put it: 
 
‘For certain behaviors, including some emotional actions, given some (often 
minimal) background knowledge about a person's situation and the knowledge 
that the person is in the grip of an [emotion], nothing further is needed to explain 
why a person engages in a behavior.’ (Kovach and de Lancey 2005: p. 114)  
 
If rational action is explained by our responsiveness to reasons then it looks as though 
rational explanation is redundant given that the presence of emotion provides a 
sufficient explanation. Call this the Redundancy Challenge: if explanation of an action by 
reference to emotion is sufficient then rational explanation is redundant.  
 
And finally, the explanation of action as done out of emotion might be thought to lack 
the characteristic structure of rational justification. When we ask why someone has 
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turned on the oven, for instance, and answer that they want to bake a cake, their goal 
explains the action; but we can also seek a deeper explanation by repeating the question 
and ask why they want to bake a cake. If the answer is that they are having guests and 
want to show hospitality then we can again ask why they want to do that. The chain of 
justifications will run out at some point, of course, but rational explanation of action has 
an in-built potential for depth, whereby immediate goals are explained by further goals 
that ground them. However, the explanation of action by reference to emotion seems to 
preclude such depth. We might be able to explain what counts in favour of a given 
emotional attitude, given a particular situation. In doing so we might explain why the 
attitude was fitting to the situation, given the formal object of the emotion.2 But can we 
say anything about why, given that they were experiencing that emotion, an agent acted 
as they did? When we ask why a person in the grip of anger kicks their car, it might 
seem that there is nothing to say other than ‘that is the kind of thing that people do 
when they are angry’. The link between emotion and action might thus be thought 
simply to be, as Goldie has argued, ‘primitively intelligible’ (Goldie 2000). Insofar as 
there is something more to say, this would be at the level of non-rational rather than 
rational explanation. Call this the No Further Justification Challenge: that there is no 
more to say, at the level of rational explanation, about why people act as they do out of a 
particular emotion.  
 
On the other hand, however, some important considerations suggest that explanation of 
action out of emotion is more continuous with rational explanation than these 
challenges would allow. For one thing, emotion is pervasive, and if action out of emotion 
                                                        
2 Though we might need more than mere fittingness to capture the idea that there is something that 
counts in favor of the emotion. See (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000). 
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were always explained non-rationally then we might think there would be few actions 
for rational explanation to explain. Yet rational explanation, in some form or another, 
seems a central part of our understanding of one another. Furthermore, while the 
challenges suggest a strict dichotomy between rational action and action out of emotion, 
it might appear, pre-theoretically at least, quite hard to tell, either first- or third-
personally, whether someone’s motivation was emotional or rational. This might cast 
doubt on the idea of a strict dichotomy, or at least suggest that it would need to be 
independently motivated. And finally, we hold one another accountable for action out of 
emotion, blamed when it is inappropriate and praised when it is appropriate. While it is 
not necessarily true to say that an action that cannot be explained rationally is one for 
which we cannot be appraised, if we think of accountability as a process of holding a 
person to a rational standard that they could and should have met, there will be a strong 
connection between accountability and a form of explanation that assumes our 
sensitivity to rational considerations (Smith 2005; Bennett 2012).  
 
In response to this contradiction, it might be argued that a range of things can be meant 
by ‘action out of emotion,’ and that each of the points noted above might be true of some 
types of such action and not true of others. We recognize interruptions to our rational 
agency and acknowledge that physical and psychological forces can leave our agency 
overborne. For instance, Rosalind Hursthouse notes that the influence of emotion on 
behaviour can range from reactions that are uncontrollable and involuntary; through 
reactions that we can prevent, either temporarily or permanently, through an act of 
will; to patterns of action and reaction that are inculcated through education and which, 
though hard to change as a result of reasoning, may be judged appropriate or 
inappropriate; to acts of emotion where the emotion is deliberately cultivated; and so 
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on (Hursthouse 1991). However, while this point is well taken, it would not explain how 
the three challenges I have just outlined could be met. What we need is an explanation 
of how it is possible that some action out of emotion can be guided by normative 
reasons to which the agent is responsive in so acting.  
 
A better response is to argue that the emotions play a role in reinforcing or disclosing 
normative reasons (Greenspan 1988; Greenspan 2000; Helm 2001; Carman 2018a; 
Carman 2018b).  For instance, the emotion of fear, it might be argued, can highlight 
prudential reasons in situations of danger; the emotion of compassion can highlight 
reasons based in the needs of others. However, even if this is correct, the range of 
emotional actions that could be shown to be rational by such a strategy looks to be 
limited. If the assumption is that the normative reasons reinforced or disclosed by the 
emotions are those that are grounded in widely recognized canons of prudential or 
instrumental rationality, or in a conception of deontic or consequentialist normative 
reasons, we will continue to struggle to make sense of the rationality of any actions for 
which none of these widely recognized rational grounds obtain. Yet there are many such 
emotional actions. Some examples are given by Hursthouse: ruffling a child’s hair out of 
affection; jealously stabbing out the eyes of a picture of a rival; etc (Hursthouse 1991). 
Another example might be the anger of oppressed peoples, which, Amia Srinivasan has 
argued, can prompt action that conflicts with what such agents have prudential reason 
to do in their situation (Srinivasan 2018). Sensing, perhaps, that not all such actions can 
merely be dismissed as irrational, but being inarticulate about what could possibly 
count in their favour, we tend to talk of them as expressive. Some theorists, furthermore, 
have defended expressive action as a valuable form of response (Anderson 1995; 
Anderson and Pildes 2000). However, for many, it remains unclear how the fact that an 
 7 
action is expressive can count rationally in its favour in the absence of rational 
grounding in those widely recognized rational grounds that we mentioned earlier.3 This 
suggests that the task of showing the rationality of action out of emotion faces a further 
challenge: the Problem of Expressive Action. This is the problem of understanding how 
action out of emotion can be rational even though its rationality cannot always be 
grounded in prudence, or instrumental rationality, or the deontic or consequentialist 
considerations highlighted by standard versions of normative theory. 
 
I will argue that the debate on the range and rationality of action out of emotion has 
thus far missed out an important way in which much action out of emotion can be seen 
as guided by considerations that the agent takes to favour so acting. To explain this, I 
will argue for the rationality of what I will call expressive action. Expressive action 
conforms to canons of rational explanation because it is guided by the agent’s 
conception of normative reasons: that is, of considerations that the agent takes to count 
in favour of so acting. Expressive action, however, is not done for a reason in the sense 
of aiming at some further end; it is rather taken to be its own end. However, we should 
not conclude that expressive action therefore has no rational basis. Expressive action 
aims, not to change the situation, but rather to do justice to it by virtue of the expressive 
power of the selected action (Bennett 2016). Expressive action is thus guided by a 
conception of expressive reasons: reasons are reasons to do justice to a situation by 
acting in a way that is expressively powerful in relation to the salient features of that 
situation. Expressive reasons would be distinct from instrumental, prudential, deontic 
                                                        
3 See e.g. Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski’s arguments against what they call ‘semiotic objections’ to 
certain market activities in (Brennan and Jaworski 2015). 
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or consequentialist reasons, and would be a sui generis type of normative reason that 
the agent takes to favour acting as they do. 
 
If this account is valid, we would have a solution of the Problem of Expressive Action 
that would show how expressive actions out of emotion can be candidates for rational 
explanation. It would show that rational explanation does not give the Wrong 
Explanation. It would also show that the idea that there is No Further Justification for 
action out of emotion is false: expressive action would be seen as guided by an agent’s 
conception of normative reasons to perform a certain action as an expressively 
powerful response that does justice to the significance of the agent’s situation. My claim 
is thus that action out of emotion that might otherwise be labelled as merely expressive 
can in fact be seen as responsive to an agent’s evaluative conception, and hence as 
rational action rather than as action brought about by forces external to rational agency. 
Furthermore, if this account of expressive action underpins an attractive account of 
emotion, it would also deal with the Redundancy Challenge by showing that rational 
and emotional explanation of action are not different species: rather the latter would be, 
in the case of expressive action, a shorthand for the former, indicating that, in acting as 
they did, the agent was guided by their grasp of the expressive reasons that applied to 
them in the situation.  
 
My argument begins by looking at an example of action out of emotion that raises the 
Problem of Expressive Action. I review alternative explanations of the actions in the 
example and, in seeing why these alternatives fail, I draw up some desiderata for a more 
adequate explanation. This more adequate explanation will turn out to be the 
expressive reasons account.  
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2. Is Action Out of Emotion the Effect of an Affect Program? 
Out of grief at the death of Patroclus, Achilles drags Hector’s lifeless body repeatedly 
around the walls of Troy. Patroclus was Achilles’ beloved, and it was Hector, prince of 
Troy, who killed him in battle. Achilles has just managed in turn to kill Hector. Hector’s 
father, King Priam, among others, is watching from the walls above as Achilles, with 
Hector’s corpse, circles below.  
 
The example (from Homer’s Iliad) is thousands of years old, yet it does not strike us as 
an unintelligible relic of a defunct culture. Without endorsing Achilles’s action, we can 
find it resonant. We can feel our way into an agential perspective in which that might 
have seemed the thing to do. In his action we can see wild grief, the dreadful egoism of a 
man-god, a burning desire for retaliation, and a cold, steely determination that those 
associated with Hector should understand that this act of revenge will not be Achilles’s 
last.  
 
A temptation, in explaining such a case, might be to assume that emotion has taken 
Achilles over, that a veil of red mist has fallen over his eyes. However, the agential 
insight that we can have into Achilles’s action – the fact that we can understand what it 
would be like to see that as the thing to do in his situation – suggests that it is 
unsatisfactory to see Achilles’s agency as simply being overborne by emotion. To see his 
agency as being overborne by emotion would be assimilate his action to the class of 
non-rational behaviour caused by physical or psychological impulses. By contrast, our 
agential insight into what Achilles does, the resonance of his actions despite their 
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horror, suggests that we are able to appreciate them as performed out of a sense of 
what counts in their favour.  
 
These considerations count against the explanation of action out of emotion put 
forward by Kovach and de Lancey (Kovach and de Lancey 2005).4  According to these 
authors, we can explain actions like that of Achilles by appeal to the idea that a class of 
mental states that they call M-emotions are states with a more or less automatic 
motivational component that bypasses reasoning and therefore is incompatible with 
rational explanation. Nevertheless, they claim, explanation of action out of emotion is 
part of common-sense understanding: 
 
‘Common sense … tells us that some emotions are states of mind, which are (1) 
motivational by default, (2) triggered by certain characteristic conditions of 
elicitation, and (3) cause certain characteristic patterns of response, including 
full-blown behaviors and actions. What common sense does not tell us is how the 
emotions possess this type of motivational power.’ (Kovach and de Lancey 2005: 
p. 108) 
 
If we want a full understanding of why emotions motivate, and why particular emotions 
motivate as they do, we do best, according to these authors, to look to an account that is 
based in our best philosophy of biology. The most promising such account, they think, is 
the ‘affect program’ theory. On this view, the mechanisms that explain action out of 
emotion are not unique to human beings; rather the explanation proceeds in terms of 
                                                        
4 For related views, see (Prinz 2004; Griffiths 1997). 
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mechanisms that are shared between animals and human beings. Action out of M-
emotions is to be explained by reference to an encapsulated ‘program’ of physiological 
changes and stereotypical actions that is automatically triggered by certain kinds of 
stimuli.  
 
It should be noted that affect program approaches don’t always take personal-level 
explanation of actions as falling within their scope. However, Kovach and de Lancey do 
apply the affect program approach to personal-level explanations. According to Kovach 
and de Lancey, the affect program view can explain why action out of emotion is not 
susceptible to ‘rationalizing’ explanations, where they assume that such explanation 
proceeds by citing an agent’s relevant beliefs and desires. The reason that such 
explanations give the Wrong Explanation is that emotions often motivate independently 
of an agent’s beliefs and desires. The reason that there is No Further Justification for 
action out of emotion, and why, as Goldie has it, such actions in the grip of given 
emotions are primitively intelligible, is that such behaviour is not produced by an agent 
responding to justifications at all. Rather a program has been triggered that bypasses 
any such processes of inference. 
 
However, is Kovach and de Lancey’s approach a full explanation of actions such as that 
of Achilles? One problem is that this approach treats Achilles’s action as something akin 
to Anscombe’s collector of saucers of mud, or Warren Quinn’s turner-on of radios – that 
is, an action for which there is no normative reason – and implies that we can have 
genuinely agential insight into it (Anscombe 1957; Quinn 1993).5 Yet if there really 
                                                        
5 These examples are commonly put forward in defense of the claim that a rational explanation of an 
action involves citing a feature of the action that the agent reasonably took to be in some way good. By 
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were No Further Justification of such actions then that would be how we would have to 
see them. Without relating these actions to the agent’s conception of normative reasons, 
we would not be able to make sense of them in the way that we commonly think we can 
make sense of a person’s actions. Furthermore, emotions do not always – or even often 
– impel us to act against our better judgement; rather very many cases of action out of 
emotion are woven unremarkably and apparently seamlessly into our rational life and 
complement rather than counteract our judgements of what we have most reason to do. 
We might think that Hume is quite right to say that calm passions accompany much of 
our experience. They do so without disrupting an intelligible, narratable pattern of 
activity that takes places in the space of reasons, respects practical norms of inference, 
and which we can make intersubjectively comprehensible (Helm 2001). Even so-called 
violent passions can prompt actions that are precisely what we endorse – at the time 
and on reflection – as that which we have most reason to do in that situation (Srinivasan 
2018). Neither can Kovach and de Lancey explain the fact that, in acting out of emotion, 
we remain accountable for what we do: accountable not simply insofar as we are able to 
impede, temporarily or permanently, the influence of the emotion on our conduct, but 
for the appropriate and proportionate nature of the emotion and its expression. As R. M. 
Adams puts it: 
 
‘among states of mind that have intentional objects, the ones for which we are 
directly responsible are those in which we are responding, consciously or 
unconsciously, to data that are rich enough to permit a fairly adequate ethical 
appreciation of the state's intentional object and of the object's place in the fabric 
                                                        
contrast, these examples are said to defy rational explanation because (at least absent some further 
context) no good seems to lie in these actions. 
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of personal relationships. Among the states of mind for which we would not be 
accountable under this criterion are simple feelings of hunger and thirst, insofar 
as they are primitive responses to physical stimuli, and many states of mind in 
young children whose experience is not yet rich enough for adequate 
appreciation of their objects.’ (Adams 1985: p. 26) 
 
In Adams’s terms, Kovach and de Lancey’s view would be an attempt to explain adult 
action out of emotion as if it were only the effect of simple feelings of hunger or thirst, 
or of childlike emotions. Presumably these authors appeal to such parallels because 
they are motivated by an ideal of explanatory parsimony. However, their approach fails 
to offer a full explanation of adult human action out of emotion. The field of significance 
to which the emotions of adult human beings respond is far richer, and demands more 
in the way of developed human capacities, than the stimuli of affect programs. 
 
3. The In Principle Articulacy of Expressive Action 
To further substantiate these claims, consider how Kovach and de Lancey’s approach 
neglects the extent to which it is often possible in principle to articulate what the agent 
saw as good or valuable in action out of emotion. Let us look again at Achilles. We can 
get a better grip on why Achilles does what he does by seeing that, although his 
situation is a cause for grief, it is not only grief that is at play. There are further aspects 
of the situation that are highly salient to Achilles and which help to constitute his 
perspective on that situation, or his construal of it (Roberts 1988). Achilles is no 
ordinary person, of course (he is the son of a goddess), and there are few obstacles that 
he has not been able to beat down by sheer force of will. He is not used to having things 
going against him, or to meeting unbending resistance. Yet here Patroclus has been 
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irrevocably taken away from him by Hector. In this situation, his feeling is not simply 
directed at the loss of Patroclus but also at the fact that the loss of Patroclus represents 
his (Achilles’s) unanswerable defeat by Hector: the loss inflicted can never be undone. 
Furthermore, so unused is he to defeat that he is simply not prepared to accept it, even 
in the face of overwhelming evidence. Thus, in response to that defeat he is also defiant: 
he will not be beaten. And so he sets out to inflict a defeat on Achilles that will allow him 
to emerge in some respect still looking like a victor, that will in part redeem his terrible 
defeat.6 He does that by reducing Hector, his defeater, to less than nothing: reducing 
him to the status of less-than-human by desecration and by preventing his family from 
engaging in the necessary rites for their son. Achilles’s construal of the situation is 
something like: how could such a nothing ever be taken to have inflicted a defeat on me? 
His choosing to desecrate Hector’s dead body thus shows his grief at the loss of 
Patroclus, to be sure, but it also shows his rage at having thus been defeated by Hector 
(that Hector should have been able to injure him, Achilles, in such an inalterable and 
undeniable way) as well as a certain powerless-yet-defiant attitude that he will not have 
it so.  
 
We can thus get a better grip on why Achilles expresses his grief as he does by bringing 
into view the highly particular combination of contextual factors to which, as he 
construes it, he is responding. Even though loss of a beloved is one theme in his 
situation, there are further salient factors that would call for different kinds of 
responses – that his situation is experienced as a defeat, say, and that he will not simply 
                                                        
6 Cf. the analysis of resentment in (Hampton 1988, p. 57).  
 15 
rest at being defeated but must come out on top. What Achilles manages to do is to find 
an action that synthesizes these various factors in a single action.  
 
Achilles’s action reflects his construal of the situation. A person without Achilles’s pig-
headed arrogance would not see the situation as he sees it, and would not experience it 
as calling for the responses that he saw as necessary. We might not expect Patroclus’s 
mother, for instance, to react in the same way to Hector because she would not 
experience his death as a blow to her pride in the way that Achilles sees it as a blow to 
his. The way in which Achilles expresses his grief for Patroclus is therefore highly 
revealing of his evaluative perspective on the situation, precisely because he manages to 
give such powerful expression to the complex attitudes he has about Patroclus’s death. 
The way he gives expression to his grief is an apt reflection of the complex significance 
he gives to the death. It is this that allows us to see the deep flaws in Achilles’s character 
embodied in his action, and therefore to see the way in which he doesn’t get the 
situation right at all, or gets some aspects of it wildly out of proportion. As Achilles 
construes it, the situation becomes all about his own need to demonstrate supremacy 
over Hector; the fact that Patroclus has lost his life is almost forgotten.  
 
This reading of Achilles’s action suggests that Kovach and de Lancey’s approach, rather 
than offering a full explanation of this paradigm case of action out of emotion, is in fact 
far too simple. Achilles’s emotion has a complex intentional content that recognizes 
various features of his situation as salient; and his action is responsive to that 
intentional content in such a way that we can read that content from his action by virtue 
of the fact that he acts rationally on the basis of that content. Thus, we can articulate – 
and indeed assess – not just the perception of the situation that provides the intentional 
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content of the emotion, but also the way in which the action is rational on the basis of 
that perception. This suggests that it would be premature to conclude that Achilles’s 
action is not to be explained as an expression of his rational agency. Rather, the reading 
we have just given sees Achilles’s action as the result of his taking that action to be in 
key respects good and valuable.  
 
These considerations suggest that rather than there being No Further Justification for 
such actions – or their simply being primitively intelligible – we can say that an account 
of actions such as Achilles’s should rather respect a condition of In Principle Articulacy: 
that in principle it is possible to articulate both 1) the intentional content of the agent’s 
emotion; and 2) what the agent took to count in favour of the action on the basis of that 
content. Now whether we can indeed articulate the basis for any given action out of 
emotion is an open question: we need to attempt the articulation and see whether we 
can get an interpretive story that fits. It is also an open question how far the range of 
action out of emotion subject to such articulation extends. Perhaps it covers Achilles’s 
case, but what about more simple acts like, say, jumping for joy or ruffling a child’s hair 
out of affection? However, in this section I have established that the articulability of 
much action out of emotion is an open question. Kovach and de Lancey’s approach, 
which treats this question as in principle closed, is not an adequate explanation of these 
cases; and the No Further Justification objection is misguided. 
 
4. The In Principle Robustness After Reflection of Expressive Action 
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to think that we have explained what Achilles does 
as instrumentally rational. Achilles’s action cannot really be believed – even by Achilles – 
actually to ameliorate the defeat he has suffered through his loss of Patroclus. If his 
 17 
action has this aim then it seems to involve a kind of ‘magical thinking:’ Achilles would 
have to be thought to forget, in the moment of action, that his action cannot possibly 
bring about the end that counts in favour of doing it.  
 
Indeed, some theorists seem to have thought that this ‘magical’ causality is the source of 
the difference between expressive and teleological action. For instance, Sartre views 
emotion as ‘a transformation of the world’, where being in the grip of an emotion allows 
us to act ‘as if’ something that we know is not possible but nevertheless want very much 
to be possible can be brought about (Sartre 2002: p. 39-40).  And while, as we have 
seen, Peter Goldie takes some emotionally motivated actions to be primitively 
intelligible, he argues that others can be seen as actions on ‘wishes’, in which the 
imagination plays a crucial role. On Goldie’s view, expressive action on a wish comes 
about when the action that is primitively intelligible as an expression of one’s emotion 
is ruled out by ‘civilizing constraints’ that one accepts.  Instead of performing that 
forbidden action, one rather performs an action that is ‘symbolically related’ to the 
primitively intelligible action that one desires to do. Goldie takes this as a potentially 
good explanation of emotional actions such as gouging out the eyes of a picture of one’s 
rival, or smashing one’s spouse’s favourite vase in the middle of a blazing row (Goldie 
2000).7  
 
                                                        
7 Kovach and De Lancey, by contrast, offer to explain such cases, not in terms of the imagined or symbolic 
fulfilment of purposes, but rather in terms of the phenomenon of ‘redirection’ of emotion, which they take 
to be exhibited in animals as well as humans, and thus not to require the powers of symbolic imagination 
appealed to in Goldie’s account. For instance, when a lioness whose tail is bitten by a cub takes it out on a 
nearby tree trunk rather than the cub itself, she is not doing it because the tree trunk is a symbolic 
substitute for the cub, but rather (presumably?) because she has a strong urge that she needs to release, 
and must do so without damaging to her cubs. However, as noted above, this apparently more 
parsimonious explanation in terms of responses humans share with non-human animals is not 
necessarily a better one if it fails to capture the richness of the structure of adult human emotions. 
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The problem with these explanations, however, is that the examples of expressions of 
emotion from which they generalize are inappropriate, in a sense I will now explain; and 
that the analysis of expressive action that they offer cannot easily be transferred to 
those cases of appropriate expression of emotion, which are significantly more 
numerous. In considering Achilles’s action, for instance, we need to bear in mind that it 
is an inappropriate expression of his grief. If there is something that Achilles takes to 
count in favour of acting in this way given what has happened to him (and to Patroclus), 
it does not actually count in its favour. This is not simply to say that his action is morally 
inappropriate. Rather it is the kind of action of which we might say, ‘I know you are 
grieving, but how could you do that?’ However, there presumably are appropriate 
expressions of grief. Indeed, it seems an engrained part of the common-sense of action-
explanation that there are appropriate ways for emotion to influence conduct, and that 
relevant examples, such as admirable expressions of sympathy, of concern, of grief, of 
anger, of resentment, of remorse, of shame, are ubiquitous. Appropriate expressions of 
emotion are also central to what feminists have called emotional care work: those 
interactions in which the support that one offers to another comes about in part 
through the emotions that, in response to their situation, one experiences and displays. 
(Ruffling a child’s hair out of affection might be part of such care work.) An account of 
action out of emotion should be able to explain cases such as Achilles, but it should also 
be able to explain cases of appropriate action out of emotion.  
 
The ‘magical thinking’ account, however, does not give a convincing explanation of such 
mundane but important forms of action out of emotion as embracing someone out of 
sympathy, or because one is glad to see them, or sorry to see them go. Such actions do 
not seem to be the wished-for or symbolic fulfilment of a primitively intelligible 
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purpose that civilization denies us. Sartre might say that our embrace of sympathy is 
based on magically thinking that one can look after the person and solve all of their 
problems. Or that the embrace of leave-taking is based on magically denying that one 
does in the end have to let the person go. However, the problem with ‘magical thinking’ 
explanations is that if they were true, they would be undermined by reflection on their 
true nature. Once the agent became aware that their emotional action was founded on a 
delusion, it would put them at odds with their own action: their action would, on 
reflection, appear to them, not merely the arational irruption of a force external to their 
agency, but as a form of irrationality taken up and pursued by their agency. However, 
this would be a highly counter-intuitive way of seeing, e.g., emotional care work. On the 
face of it, there are many expressive actions that do not strike us as being irrational on 
reflection. Thus while the ‘readings’ of various emotions that Sartre and Goldie offer can 
be illuminating and insightful, they cannot be the whole story about the intelligibility of 
action out of emotion. The ‘magical thinking’ account is too sweeping: it explains all 
action out of emotion on the basis of some eye-catching but inappropriate examples. 
 
We can therefore give a further desideratum for a more adequate explanation of action 
out of emotion: that it allows at least some, and perhaps many, such actions to be In 
Principle Robust After Reflection. The In Principle Robustness After Reflection condition 
adds the further desideratum that an adequate understanding of cases such as Achilles’s 
should not rule out in principle that our sense of expressive action being the thing to do 
when in the grip of an emotion might survive reflective awareness of the nature of that 
action-tendency. In other words, we want it to be possible that in at least some – and 
perhaps many – cases of emotional action we can know exactly what we are doing but 
still think it the thing to do. 
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5. The Expressive Reasons Account 
Rather than ascribing a magical belief to agents acting out of emotion, I suggest that we 
rather see them as, at least potentially, acting in ways that they take themselves to have 
good normative reason to act. As I have noted, many actions out of emotion appear to 
cohere with actions motivated by our evaluative conception. However, the Problem of 
Expressive Action that I noted at the start points out that many such actions cannot be 
seen as guided by those normative reasons recognized by standard views of practical 
rationality. If, as I have suggested, it would be unacceptable not to recognize the 
rationality of such action out of emotion, we rather need to consider expanding the 
range of normative practical reasons that, as theorists, we recognize.  
 
The explanation I will put forward focuses on a category of expressive actions; and 
action on expressive normative reasons. Goldie is on the right lines, I think, in appealing 
to the symbolism of expressive actions. However, he goes wrong in assuming that the 
only way that action out of emotion could be symbolic would be as the wishful diversion 
of a primitively intelligible but impermissible action. As we have seen, this proposal fails 
the test of In Principle Robustness After Reflection. However, perhaps there is a more 
positive role for symbolism, on which it is possible that symbolic actions do pass the 
Robustness After Reflection test.  
 
Sometimes what is important to people is to find a response to a situation that does not 
attempt to change it but rather that acknowledges or does justice to its gravity, or more 
generally, what is salient in it (Bennett 2016). Take, for instance, the case of a religious 
believer, overcome with emotion in the presence of their god, falling to their knees in 
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church. Following the symbolic action approach, we could say that this action 
symbolizes the attitude of reverence and awe that believers feel in the presence of a 
being whose worth is incomparably higher than their own. It is an appropriate symbol 
because lowering oneself reflects the highness of one’s god. However, assuming for a 
moment that this is plausible, why do they seek thus to symbolize their attitudes? My 
suggestion is that in doing so they are seeking to do justice to the situation as it strikes 
them. Their action attempts in some adequate way to mark it, or acknowledge its 
importance.  
 
The thought here is that there are simply certain moments in our lives that we need to 
recognize as special, to mark in some adequate way, either to celebrate or deprecate. In 
attempting to do justice to such situations, we thus dwell on events and we lift them out 
of the interminable onrush of indiscriminate events (‘one damn thing after another’) 
and give them a special status in our lives. Dwelling on them is part of taking them 
seriously. These moments may be moments of significant achievement; or of 
wrongdoing or evil; moments of rupture or repair; moments of significant social or 
personal change. Or they may simply be moments in which some important aspect of 
reality is disclosed to one’s view, as with the way in which one’s child suddenly appears 
to one as particularly charming, or cute, or affection-worthy – or whatever is captured 
by the action of ruffling her hair (and there are many different ways that this action can 
be performed, corresponding to different aspects of the child being perceived as 
salient). In lifting these moments out of the mundane, we also create memories of them 
that will last – and this has value both for what we can learn from them, but also 
because some things demand not to be forgotten in the way most of the moments of our 
lives are quickly forgotten. This helps to ensure that these moments will be given the 
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special treatment they deserve, but also make our own lives more meaningful, since the 
tenor of our lives is not merely instantaneous but has peaks and troughs and a thread of 
connections to the past. 
 
If, as I argue here, we do sometimes seek to do justice to significant situations in which 
we find ourselves, we need some basis on which to do so. Our starting point – it is hard 
to see where else we might begin – is a vocabulary of expressively powerful actions, 
actions that, by virtue of symbolic connections with the nature of the situation to which 
they refer, can be understood as a satisfying way to capture or distil the significance of 
the situation. This is how we can understand the kneeling of the believer; or the self-
covering of the person gripped by shame; or the distancing from the wrongdoer enacted 
by the person righteously condemning; or the embrace of the person filled with 
sympathy for a suffering other. Otherwise put, action out of emotion expresses an 
emotion by virtue of possessing expressive properties that relate appropriately to the 
situation to which the emotion is directed. If these expressive properties count in favour 
of an action as a way of doing justice to the situation then we can say that we have 
expressive reason to act in that way. If the best explanation of why we act in that way is 
that we take ourselves to have reason so to do justice to the situation in virtue of the 
expressive properties of the action then we can say that we act on expressive reasons. 
 
We can therefore distinguish between acts that are ‘expressive of’ some attitude or 
emotion, in the sense that I have in mind, and acts that are caused by some attitude or 
emotion without being ‘expressive of’ it. Take being caused to run away by the sight of a 
human shape unexpectedly visible in the corner of your room as you return to your 
dark house one night. Your act of running away may be caused by your fear. But it is not 
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expressive of it in the sense that I am interested in. We can see actions that are 
‘expressive of’ an emotion as being taken by their agents to be appropriate by virtue of 
being expressively powerful in relation to the situation as the agent experiences it. We 
perform such actions guided by a sense, in other words, of the power of these actions as 
a response to what is salient in the situation as we construe it. 
 
Expressive reasons are a sui generis category of normative reason, different from 
instrumental reasons, prudential reasons, reasons of obligation or consequentialist 
reasons. A full specification of an expressive reason for any particular action would be 
as follows: 
 
a) In at least some situations, there are reasons, not just to promote a further 
end, but rather to do justice to the import of the situation. 
b) In order to do justice to the situation one has reason to do something that is 
symbolically related to the situation. 
c) There are reasonably determinate criteria of symbolic adequacy, so one has 
reason to do an action of a particular sort when one has the aim of doing justice 
to one’s situation. 
 
If this analysis is plausible then the Problem of Expressive Action would be solved. The 
solution to that problem would also show that the Wrong Explanation challenge fails, as 
does the No Further Justification challenge. Against the No Further Justification 
challenge, we have seen that desiderata on an explanation of expressive action are its In 
Principle Articulacy, and its In Principle Robustness After Reflection. Assuming that 
expressive action is action out of emotion then the Redundancy challenge also fails. 
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It might be objected, however, that my response to the problem of the rationality of 
action out of emotion is in terms of expressive action, whereas it is possible to engage in 
expressive action without emotion. An action is expressive, I have claimed, by virtue its 
expressive properties. But what makes these properties expressive is their relation to 
features of the situation. In other words, an agent who, say, kneels in church may be 
doing something that has powerful expressive properties, even if the agent themselves 
are not themselves particularly moved by the situation. If this is correct then the agent’s 
action might have the relevant expressive properties, and thus be expressive of awe, 
even though it does not express their awe. It might thus be argued that the expressive 
reasons account has not explained the target phenomenon: that is, those actions out of 
emotion that raise the Problem of Expressive Action. Expressive action (i.e. action with 
expressive properties) is not the same as action out of emotion. 
 
However, this conclusion would be unwarranted. It is true that it is possible to engage in 
expressive action without emotion. But it is possible to act in all sorts of ways 
characteristic of emotion without experiencing that emotion – and without the action 
being done from the emotion. Nevertheless, this objection raises some pertinent 
questions. If expressive action involves acting on expressive reasons, and much action 
out of emotion is expressive action, how is acting on expressive reasons out of emotion 
different from acting on expressive reasons without emotion? How does an awareness 
of expressive reasons contribute to the development and individuation of emotions? 
 
Now it is true that I have not given a full theory of the emotions – not even of those 
emotions for which the characteristic actions can be explained as expressive actions. 
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And it might seem strange to have a theory of action out of emotion without having a 
theory of emotion. However, it is likely that a number of theories of emotion might be 
compatible with what I have to say about expressive action. Nevertheless, we can ask 
what would have to be true of the emotions for the expressive reasons account to be a 
good explanation of (some) action out of emotion can be compatible with canons of 
rational explanation. In answering this question, we should bear in mind that we are 
looking to capture the conception of emotion to which we appeal when, in explaining 
actions, we adopt the perspective of what P. F. Strawson calls ‘ordinary, adult 
interpersonal relationships’ (Strawson 1962). According to the Strawsonian approach, 
the ‘interpersonal’ understanding we are talking about is of a fundamentally different 
order to that we achieve when we explain a part of nature as governed by causal laws. 
For instance, were it possible to understand a highly complex phenomenon non-
rationally, such as the weather system in a given locality, this would involve 
understanding causal mechanisms that work in a law-like way to produce certain kinds 
of weather given certain background conditions. By contrast, the understanding we 
seek in the context of ‘ordinary, adult interpersonal relationships’ explains what 
happens largely as the outcome of agents responding to what they rationally take to be 
normative reasons. Thus in saying what an emotion is within the interpersonal 
perspective on human behaviour, we should not take for granted accounts of the 
emotions, grounded in the natural sciences, that leave rational agency out of the picture. 
Indeed, I have tried to show some of what would be lost if we did not see action out of 
emotion as action governed by the agent’s conception of normative reasons. 
 
Beyond that negative point, what the theory of expressive action helps to explains is the 
nature of the connection between (i) the object of the emotion – the nature of the 
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situation to which the emotion responds – and (ii) the motivational tendency of the 
emotion – that is, the pattern of action to which the emotion characteristically prompts. 
An emotion is in part a regular pattern of action-readiness and execution, accompanied 
by feelings associated with arousal to act, and patterns of attention that tend to focus on 
the aspects of the situation to which those actions are geared to respond. One crucial 
question about emotion concerns the nature of this object-action link, and hence in 
virtue of what the various elements of an emotional response hang together. The 
expressive action theory says that the object-action link of the relevant kind of emotion 
makes a claim within the space of reasons: the object-action link effectively says that a 
given situation contains something of value or disvalue that needs to be lifted out of the 
ordinary run of events and marked as significant; and that this action is the appropriate 
way to respond, or to do justice to, that particular value or disvalue.  
 
Now this line of thought might suggest a particular story about the emotions. For 
instance, we might speculate that expressive actions arise at some point in human 
cultural development. The explanation for this might be the nature of a particular 
culture, or our inherited emotional psychology, or our engagement with an objective 
realm of value, or some hybrid of all three, depending on which historical and meta-
ethical stories are the right ones. Further, imagine that, through patterns of 
socialization, two things happen. Firstly, perhaps through their adoption in shared 
forms of ritual, particular expressive action types become socially entrenched, thereby 
cementing certain object-action links in the collective consciousness. And secondly (as a 
result of socialization, or our inherited psychology, or our engagement with the realm of 
objective value), people yet come to find such acts satisfying vehicles through which to 
express their own emotions. In that case we would have an explanation of how certain 
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emotions (emotions that are socially constructed, in at least some sense of that term) 
would involve object-response pairings that are widely shared and found expressively 
powerful.  
 
This story is speculative, but if it is along the right lines, we would have an explanation 
of how expressive action explains (some) action out of emotion even if expressive 
action does not require emotion. It would explain such action out of emotion because 
expressive action figures in the full explanation of the development and individuation of 
the emotions. Our story about expressive action would explain how the range of ways in 
which action out of emotion can be guided by normative reasons expands beyond 
prudential, instrumental, deontic or consequentialist reasons. Furthermore, there 
would then be a ready explanation of why much expressive action is non-accidentally 
done out of emotion: for instance, when it involves a heightened, engaged awareness of 
the force of those reasons.8 The expressive action account would also explain how the 
various components of the relevant emotions hang together as a coherent whole. The 
intentional object of one of the relevant emotions, for instance, would be that aspect of 
the situation that is valuable in precisely such a way as to call for the prompted action. 
Emotion phenomenology would be explained through attentional focus on that 
particular value or disvalue while the process of arousal towards the associated action 
is going on. 
 
If some such story is true, it would also help to address the Redundancy objection by 
showing how explanations of action in terms of following expressive reasons are 
                                                        
8 This is an important point of overlap between the approach of the present paper and that of (Carman 
2018a). 
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entangled with explanation in terms of emotion. Expressive reasons would not only be 
reasons for action but would also be reasons for emotion. Furthermore, it would explain 
how reasons for action and reasons for emotion are related to one another: if one has a 
reason to experience an emotion one would, if the appropriateness of the emotion is 
based on the appropriateness of the expressive action, thereby have at least a pro tanto 
reason for action, at least in the case of those emotions with a significant motivational 
component. 
 
Nevertheless, it might seem implausible that in acting spontaneously out of emotion we 
could really be thought of as doing something as elaborate as symbolizing the 
intentional content of our emotions, and thereby following expressive reasons. Have I 
been too quick with the idea that action out of emotion is rooted in the non-rational? 
Now of course all of our rational capacities are to some degree rooted in the non-
rational: only because there is much us about us that is non-agential can we be agents. 
We do not need to deny that action out of emotion is rooted in what is not rational, even 
if we insist that it can be guided by normative reasons. The point for which I have been 
arguing here is that, with respect to a significant class of action out of emotion, we will 
not have a full explanation of the action by pointing only to non-rational processes and 
mechanisms. We will not have a full explanation until we understand the reasons on 
which such actions are done.  
 
Furthermore, the standpoint of rational explanation does not rule out spontaneous 
action. Its reference to the agent being guided by a conception of normative reasons 
does not rule out e.g., a highly skilled football player’s manoeuvres in the fast rough-
and-tumble of an unfolding game. Rational explanation can also accommodate habitual 
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actions such as successfully following the route to work while having a complex 
conversation that takes all of one’s attention. In these cases, the actions can still be seen 
as rationally guided to the extent that they are controlled by – and would not have been 
performed without the existence of – an overarching grasp of what one has reason to 
do.9 If expressive action along the lines sketched here were such that we learned from 
an early age what kinds of acts were expressively appropriate to what broad range of 
situations, then there seems to be no reason to think our vocabulary of such acts could 
not become as spontaneous as our use of language, or of other skilled and habitual 
practices into which we are inculcated from birth. In Achilles’s situation the symbolism 
of annihilating Hector comes naturally to him, given his inheritance of a certain 
vocabulary of expressive action and his application of it to his situation. This is a matter 
of second rather than first nature.10 
 
Nevertheless, there might be a worry that, if my story were correct, it would have to 
appear more obvious to us than it does that when we act out of emotion, we are in fact 
seeking to do justice to our situation. However, the symbolic action approach doesn’t 
have to insist that e.g. in ruffling my child’s hair I act, at that moment, under the 
description, ‘doing justice to my situation,’ or ‘symbolizing my attitudes’. Sometimes we 
can have an adequate grasp of our reasons without having a complete grasp. 
Furthermore, another possibility might be that in performing the actions that I have 
called expressive, we do not always, or even often, follow expressive reasons. We might 
simply perform these actions because we have learned that this is the socially accepted 
                                                        
9 Cf. the discussion of ‘intentions-in-action’ in (Searle 1983: pp. 84-5). For the notion of action being 
controlled by a purpose, see e.g. (Pettit 2018). In respect to action out of emotion, see for instance the 
discussion of executive intentions in (Pacherie 2002). 
10 To use John McDowell’s distinction. See (McDowell 1994). 
 30 
‘script’ for these kinds of situations. However, in discovering the reason for the action – 
as supplied, let us assume, by the expressive reason account – one would gain a greater 
insight into one’s own action, and would be enabled to act rationally out of emotion in a 
way one had not previously been able to. The expressive reason account would thus 
have the effect of allowing us to achieve greater transparency over the rationality 
immanent in the social forms that, up to now perhaps, we may simply have blindly 
adopted. Increasing transparency in regard to our reasons is an important ideal: it puts 
us in a position of greater rational control over our action, and thus allows our actions 
more perfectly to approximate the ideal of rational thought translated into action. This 
is a kind of Kantian or Hegelian line of thought. Greater rational control means greater 
self-determination, and a gradual overcoming of the heteronomy of being the 
unreflective agents of nature or society. Alternatively, of course, we might come to 
realize that these emotions are based on object-action links that became ingrained in 
our psychology as a result of rituals from a now-distant culture, and that once 
articulated, which we can no longer find resonant. Either way, articulating the 
expressive reasons that guide much of our action out of emotion promises greater self-
understanding and greater rational control. 
 
6. Conclusion 
At the outset of the paper, we saw that rational explanation of action out of emotion 
faces a number of challenges. The Wrong Explanation Challenge says that explaining 
action out of emotion by reference to a purpose rather than an emotion gets it wrong. 
The Redundancy Challenge says that if explanation of an action by reference to emotion 
is sufficient then rational explanation is redundant. And the No Further Justification 
Challenge says that there is no more to say, at the level of rational explanation, about 
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why people act as they do out of a particular emotion. Furthermore, even if these 
challenges can be addressed, there is a Problem of Expressive Action, since many 
actions out of emotion seem unpromising candidates for being guided by normative 
practical reasons of the prudential, instrumental, deontic or consequentialist sort. 
However, in thinking about how to explain the expression of Achilles’s grief and anger, I 
have argued that we have to see his action, and that of appropriate expressions of grief 
and anger, as expressive actions guided by a conception of normative practical reasons 
rather than as either the effect of an affect program or the symbolic fulfilment of a 
frustrated wish. Expressive action is guided by the agent’s conception of expressive 
reasons, insofar as the agent seeks to do justice to the situation by virtue of the action’s 
expressive power. Action out of emotion can be seen as responsive to an agent’s 
evaluative conception, and hence as rational action rather than the product of forces 
external to rational agency.  
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